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BODILY LIMITS TO AUTONOMY:
EMOTION, ATTITUDE, AND SELF-DEFENSE
Sylvia Burrow
Many of us took pride in never feeling violent, never hitting. We had not thought deeply
about our relationships to inflicting physical pain. Some of us expressed terror and
awe when confronted with physical strength on the part of others. For us, the healing
process included the need to learn how to use physical force constructively, to remove
the terror—the dread.
—bell hooks, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black
1. INTRODUCTION
Feminist theories of autonomy acknowledge the complexities of cultivating and
expressing autonomy under oppressive social structures. A prominent concern
of these theories is that unreflectively endorsing oppressive social norms, beliefs,
and values undercuts autonomy. Less attention has been paid to constraints
on women's autonomy that are encoded in the body, what I will refer to as
bodily encoded limits to autonomy. For instance, some physically restrictive
postures and movements exemplify or express a femininity of compliance or
passivity. Such bodily encoded limits to autonomy are not only worrisome in
themselves, they are troubling in light of the prevalence of violence against
women. Attitudes of compliance and passivity lessen the likelihood of active
prevention or resistance against personal violence (Bart 1985). Moreover, often
I extend my appreciation to audience members at the Athens Institute for Education and Research
International Conference on Philosophy and the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy
Conference at Dalhousie University, and to Michael Manson, Robin Dillon, Carolyn MacLeod,
Letitia Meynell, Susan Sherwin, and Sue Campbell for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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after experiencing personal violence, a sense of physical powerlessness, low self-
esteem, self-blame, or shame further restrict agency (Penn and Nardos 2003).
Susan Brison (1999) has suggested self-defense training as a concrete means
of developing autonomy in the aftermath of violence. However, she warns
that self-defense is not a panacea. Quoting C. H. Sparks and Bat-Ami Bar On
(1985), she asserts: "self-defense tactics are 'stopgap measures which fail to link
an attack against one victim with attacks on others.' And . . . 'knowledge that
one can fight if attacked is also a very different kind of security from enjoying
a certainty that one will not be attacked at all"' (Brison 1999, 220-21). Is self-
defense simply a stopgap measure? What kind of security might it offer? And
how might it promote autonomy? Although Brison's account helps to motivate
these questions, it insufficiently explores the potential self-defense training
offers in answer to them.
If self-defense training were simply a stopgap measure, then it would function
as a temporary solution for the problem of violence against women. But I hold
out for a view of self-defense training as much more than a stopgap, for two
reasons. First, self-defense training is valuable for women because it provides
a security that one can avoid or counter personal violence directed toward
oneself. Second, self-defense training is a source of self-confidence. For women
living within a social network working to undermine their self-trust and self-
esteem, it is important to cultivate self-confidence, particularly since elements
of that network involve threatening displays of aggression or superiority. Self-
defense training in my account is not simply a route to recovery in the wake of
personal violence. Instead, and primarily, it is the development of skills aimed
at preventing personal violence. My aim is to show that the development of
self-defense skills functions as a means of overcoming bodily encoded limits to
autonomy. Through this discussion, I hope to broaden our understanding of the
embodied nature of autonomy by illuminating the connection between bodily
training and responses such as self-confidence, self-trust, and self-esteem.
2. RESTRICTED SITE: THE BODY
Traditionally, autonomy theorists have upheld the view that autonomous action
proceeds from beliefs, values, or desires that are "wholeheartedly endorsed" or
otherwise reflective of one's "true self" or "real self."1 Such theories lack reflective
i. Following Frankfurt's (1971) view or its Kantian precursor. For an overview see Wolf (1993).
Es
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attention to the self's historical and social context because they consider
individuals to be independent and self-defining. Persons are autonomous
if their actions proceed from wholeheartedly endorsed values; otherwise,
they are not. In contrast, feminist autonomy theorists tend to view the self as
inherently relational. This relational self is connected to other selves socially and
historically and develops autonomy in and through relationships of dependence
and interdependence.2 Autonomy becomes a complex matter for the feminist
autonomy theorist, who recognizes that it is not unusual for persons to act on
the basis of internalized social norms and values not endorsed as "one's own,"
which may constrain autonomy to different degrees. Diana Meyers's (1987; 1989;
20043) account of autonomy is notably instructive here.
Meyers's account widens the idea of autonomy beyond its traditional
boundaries through conceiving of autonomy on a continuum. Autonomy
progresses through the development of autonomy competencies: coordinated
skills of introspection, imagination, reasoning, and volition (1987, 627; 2004a,
10). To the degree that one exercises autonomy competencies, one is autonomous.
So, even persons lacking self-determination in many aspects of their lives may
not thereby lack autonomy, not if they act autonomously within certain pockets
of their lives. For instance, a woman who has not reflected upon her traditional
feminine roles may exercise autonomy in deciding to be a stay-at-home mother,
even if she lacks the wider autonomy we would attribute to her were she to have
reflectively chosen her life plan.
Meyers argues that autonomous selves are relational selves who learn to
become autonomous through concrete interactions with others, emphasizing
that selves are socially constituted, embodied beings situated within historical
and social frameworks (1989,189-202). Nevertheless, earlier formations of her
theory privilege psychological competencies—those cognitive and imaginative
skills permitting critical reflection on one's beliefs, values, or preferences—
suggesting that autonomy proceeds to a degree correlative to one's ongoing
process of critical self-reflection. But, as Meyers recognizes in her later work
(20043; 2005), if the relational self must be understood as an embodied self to
form and maintain its relationships and learn skills from others, then it matters
to the development of autonomy that the self is embodied. We might wonder if
the body matters even more directly to the development of autonomy. Is there
some sense in which we can describe autonomy as itself embodied?
2. See, for instance, Code (1991), Whitbeck (1983) and Baier (1985).
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One way to recognize the embodied nature of autonomy is to acknowledge
the body as a site for suffering constraints on autonomy. Before turning to
Meyers's later work, let me expand on how oppressive social norms and ideals of
femininity can restrict autonomy through the body. First, a prominent element
of traditional Western feminine ideals is the expectation that women and girls
should take up as little physical space as possible (Frye 1983). Elbows are tucked
in, ankles or knees are crossed or firmly pressed together, arms and hands
are often folded together. Women are encouraged to view the body as, in Iris
Marion Young's (2005) words, a "fragile encumbrance." Feminine socialization
trains women to view the body as an object of appreciation rather than an
instrument one might use to effect action in the world (34). Limited physicality
undermines autonomy by reducing or removing the possibility of certain forms
of self-expression. One's body represents to others how one values oneself; thus
restrictions of bodily expression may undermine self-appreciation. Wilting,
passive physical postures and movements represent a devaluing of oneself as
unworthy of equal status and standing before others (Bartky 1990). As Marilyn
Frye perceptively notes, feminine ideals are reflected in "a network of behaviors
through which we constantly announce to others our membership in a lower
caste and our unwillingness and/or inability to defend our bodily or moral
integrity. It is degrading and a pattern of degradation" (1983,16). Persons limiting
their physical presence in and movement through the world in degrading ways
thus appear to undermine the very possibility of their own self-appreciation.
Second, endorsing feminine ideals can limit one's capacity to act by literally
weakening the body. Naomi Wolf's (1991) account of the Beauty Myth shows
how girls and women often suffer depleted bodily energy through trying to
achieve ideals of Western feminine beauty. Perceived body image is a common
barometer of self-esteem and self-worth for women and girls (Castillo
1996). Thus it is no surprise that empirical studies have shown correlations
between eating disorders and low self-esteem and dissatisfaction with bodily
appearance (Button et al. 1997). In addition, those attempting to achieve an
ideal of thinness often experience a lack of energy directly related to dieting
or exercising excessively. Passivity, lack of energy, and low self-esteem work
together to limit the freedom and vitality of one's bodily expression. Such
limits suggest a familiar theme: that to be feminine is to be acquiescent. The
acquiescent possess a reduced ability to act and thus a diminished resistance to
socially and politically oppressive forces. Hence, I doubt Wolf is exaggerating
matters in asserting that the Beauty Myth "is not an obsession about beauty, it
is an obsession about female obedience" (1991,187).
i;Ii
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Third, a culture of violence against women and girls creates an environment
that entrenches female passivity. Learning that one's responses for coping with
or preventing personal violence are generally ineffective, persons can become
passive and accepting of abuse; doing nothing becomes a defensive response.
Lacking the motivation to prevent or resist harm to oneself is associated with
feelings of helplessness, depression, and low self-esteem (Penn and Nardos 2003,
148—50). Furthermore, the threat of personal violence may be internalized in
conjunction with imperatives of femininity such that women become unaware
of the ways in which their own actions support a culture of female passivity and
oppression. So in sum, women's bodies are a common site of bodily encoded
constraints that limit autonomy.
In her more recent work, Meyers argues that emancipating women from
oppressive ideals encoded in the body cannot occur unless women treat their
bodies as repositories of meaning, learning to understand which meanings
deposited in the body are pernicious so as to purge the body of them (2004a,
89). Through personal transformation of the body, such as changing beauty
rituals, altering bodily looks, or using the body in new ways through dance
or self-defense, women can reconfigure their "psycho-corporeal identity" (85).
Since the body is an important site of agency and identity, "psycho-corporeal
identity" is tightly tied to "psycho-corporeal agency" for Meyers. While I do
not aim to provide a comprehensive account here, I endorse the view that
physiological and psychological capacities each enable autonomous action,
often in ways affecting one another. Consider, for example, Susan Brison's
(1999) view that personal transformation in the aftermath of trauma needs to
involve changing more than cognitive beliefs. Responses such as fearfulness,
helplessness, anxiety, depression, tendency to self-blame, or an inability to get
angry can each restrict action in the face of dangerous settings or situations.
Physically retraining one's responses so that one can get angry or act defiantly
to protect oneself can thus be an important step in the recovery of diminished
or lost autonomy.
While I agree that personal transformation may prove to be an important
source of expanding women's autonomy, a deeper explanation of how bodily
encoded limits to autonomy could be addressed through such practices is
needed. In what follows, I plan to construct an account of how training the body
through self-defense practice might overcome bodily restrictions to autonomy.
Although Meyers (20043) appeals to Brison in endorsing self-defense as a route
to personal transformation, neither offers much of an explanation as to how
it might expand autonomy. I hope to show that self-defense training provides
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a means of developing those emotional and attitudinal responses essential to
women's development of autonomy under threat of personal violence.
3. SELF-DEFENSE AND AUTONOMY COMPETENCIES
Persons who are oppressed face systematic limitations, barriers, and harms
(Frye 1983). Women are oppressed by virtue of belonging to a worldwide group
of persons who are routinely targeted by personal violence.3 Violence and
the threat of violence are among the most severe modes of oppression that
affect women as a group. This particular form of oppression is inextricably
tied to other systems of domination. Those who resist oppression and resolve
to act despite or because of oppression risk severe reprisals. In the case of
threat of personal violence, resisting oppressive practices can be prohibitively
intimidating. Nevertheless, resistance is essential to autonomous action in
oppressive contexts. To possess autonomy more fully over one's life, Meyers
asserts that persons must "be ready to resist the unwarranted demands of other
individuals along with conformist societal pressures, and ...be resolved to carry
out their own plans" (1987, 627; emphasis mine). The following analysis of the
skills acquired through self-defense training reveals that it develops the critical
autonomy competencies of resistance and resolve; thus self-defense is one
concrete means for fostering autonomy under threat of personal violence.
Personal violence encompasses many forms, including physical, emotional,
sexual, and financial abuse.4 The immediate aim of self-defense is to prevent
physical or sexual harms to the self, so in speaking of self-defense as a response
to personal violence I will refer to this narrower domain of harm. Oppressed
persons who are attuned to a heightened threat of personal violence, as women
are, have an awareness of the frequency with which others' intimidating or
threatening postures, words, or actions may turn into assaults against their
bodies. Accordingly, women often have a set of techniques aimed at avoiding or
withstanding assault. We see women engage in evasive actions as part of a daily
routine. Such actions include: strategically parking cars or planning walking
and bus routes; arranging companions for traveling; attending to type and style
of clothing and shoes; and purchasing security alarms or systems, guns, pepper
3. Amnesty International (2006) has accrued data from over fifty independent world surveys on
violence against women indicating that, on average, one in three women worldwide will experience
personal violence in her lifetime.
4.1 appeal here to the classification of personal violence outlined in VAWD (2004).
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spray, whistles, or guard dogs. These preparations aim to prevent harm to the
self, but they do not constitute self-defense as I discuss it in this paper. Guns,
tasers, pepper spray, or guard dogs may be used in self-defense, but their use
does not cultivate what I shall call "the skills of self-defense." The skills of self-
defense are cultivated through the development of coordinated sets of cognitive
and physiological skills permitting one to defend oneself against harm.5 Self-
defense training is the endeavor to acquire and improve such skills.
Self-defense training cultivates interdependent skills acquired through
repeated training over time.6 These skills divide into two sorts. Most obviously,
a repertoire of physical abilities and techniques is needed to prevent personal
violence. Learning blocks, escape moves, strikes, kicks, punches, grappling,
locks, and throws all count as the sorts of physical skills one might learn in
self-defense training. Additionally, an importantly related set of reactive
skills is acquired during self-defense training, those attitudes and emotional
dispositions suited to successfully executing physical self-defense techniques.
Physical and psychological competencies work together in producing accurately
placed, well-timed responses reliant upon appropriate motivation. We might
envision the complementary nature of both sorts of competencies through
picturing a traditional martial arts class, which at its best trains students in
physical techniques practiced with respect, confidence, pride without arrogance,
tranquility of mind, and resolution of purpose. Self-defense classes abstracted
from their martial art background including such elements of training will also
qualify as developing self-defense skills.7
Self-defense training furthers the exercise and development of the capacities
of resistance and resolve. It does so through developing a confidence in one's
ability to protect and defend oneself that is rooted in the body in two sorts
of ways, each correlating to the set of self-defense skills outlined above. First,
confidence in the physical skills needed to defend oneself is gained through the
process of learning to defend oneself, plus the subsequent testing and retesting
of those skills. This self-confidence is borne out of bodily experience. Either
5. Of course, some of these actions might be most effective if one becomes skilled in doing
them, and one might become effectively skilled in several of these sorts of actions. But skills such
as setting an alarm, training a guard dog, or planning a walking route need not be skills that are
developed in coordination with one another.
6. For the purposes of this paper I assume that traditional martial arts training is empty-hand
training, which trains the practitioner in self-defense through using the body alone.
7. Taking a few classes in self-defense will not produce a person skilled in self-defense, but
neither need one train for years in order to be skilled. One may be said to possess this skill when one
is judged by senior experts as capable of defending oneself in training exercises and tests.
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one can escape a tight grip on one's wrist or one cannot; repeated success
entails self-confidence in that technique. Success in many different sorts of
techniques and responses will generate a broader sense of self-confidence in
one's self-defense skills on the whole. Second, training in self-defense develops
confidence in one's emotional and cognitive reactions to threats of personal
violence. Physical training succeeds well or poorly according to the emotional
and cognitive responses of the practitioner. The body concretely reflects those
responses. Those who become frightened or startled, or who fail to move due
to hesitation or uncertainty, lose the timing essential to successfully executing
self-defense techniques. Attackers will not wait while one overcomes one's
initial responses or contemplates what to do.
It is thus essential to self-defense training that emotional and attitudinal
competencies are trained in conjunction with physical competencies. These
components of self-defense training are distinct, but they are developed
concomitantly—indeed, it is typically the aim of this training to develop
such physiological and psychological elements together. Through self-defense
training one develops confidence not only that one can execute specific physical
techniques but that one will also possess the motivational wherewithal to
successfully perform those techniques, even under pressing circumstances. The
self-confidence produced through self-defense training is a significant source
of the resolve to act to defend oneself and of the motivation to resist threats to
the self. Since both resistance and resolve are key autonomy competencies, the
self-confidence produced through self-defense training promotes autonomy.
4. SELF-DEFENSE AND SELF-APPRECIATION
A number of feminist theorists have recently offered analyses of the importance
of positive self-regarding attitudes to women's agency. The discussion above has
shown that self-defense training fosters self-confidence. I shall now expand my
analysis to consider the contribution of this training and the self-confidence
it furthers to other attitudes of self-appreciation, the cultivation of which
support the flourishing of autonomy. I aim to show how my account is able
to both accommodate and enrich recent feminist reflection on the nature and
importance of self-regard. Autonomy is a function not only of the capacity
to choose freely and to act on those choices, it is also a function of the ability
to do so as a person situated within concrete relational contexts, contexts
that may undermine or enhance choice and action. Hence, my account more
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widely shows how self-defense training improves the prospect for autonomy,
understood both in its traditional and relational senses.
In an importantly generative work on the concept of self-trust, Trudy
Govier draws parallels between self-trust and the trust we have in others.
One trusts oneself if one can expect behavior that is not harmful to oneself,
that proceeds from favorable motives, and that reflects one's sense of what
it means to be a good person. Self-trust involves one's willingness to rely or
depend upon oneself, to regard oneself as well-intentioned and competent
to make and act on judgments or decisions. Moreover, one regards oneself
in this sort of positive light even in the face of others' superficial evidence
or criticism (Govier 1993, 105-6). Indeed, self-trust seems to reveal itself
just at those times others challenge or question us. "And, that is often: other
people, the social world, and the physical world challenge us in many ways,
and we have to act. We have to make judgments about what is going on, make
decisions and implement them, and do this ourselves. If we are insecure in
our sense of our own values, motives, and capacities, we cannot think and
act effectively"*(io6). With Govier's description of self-trust in mind, we
can understand how the self-confidence I have discussed is integral to self-
trust: to doubt oneself is to question one's competence. Self-doubt, whether
through doubting one's capacities or one's resolution to act, entails that one
does not trust oneself to act.
Carolyn McLeod (2002) and Karen Jones (1996) argue that self-trust is an
attitude toward one's motives for action; recognizing the risk of self-sabotage,
self-trusting people are nevertheless optimistic about their own motives. This
point is worth expanding. Self-trust varies in degree according to context:
we may be confident that we are competent in certain areas, but doubt our
competence in others. The self-confidence produced through self-defense
training produces self-trust—one trusts that one's emotional, attitudinal,
and physical responses will come together to enable one to defend oneself
when required. This self-confidence arguably supports an optimism, not just
about one's motives or ability to act, but about how one will act if challenged
by others. Thus we can see close links between self-trust and self-confidence
and how self-defense training fosters both. Since both Jones and McLeod are
concerned to contrast self-trust to self-confidence, each misses this importance
of self-confidence to self-trust.
Govier's account provides further links between self-trust and self-esteem.
She draws a picture of the self-esteem essential to self-trust as consisting of
basic self-acceptance, a noncomparative, internally held view that one is
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fundamentally a worthy and adequate person (Govier 1993,113). Autonomous
persons have the sort of basal self-esteem that affords them a resiliency of
the self against the claims of others, a resiliency that is evident in those who
trust themselves. Similarly, Govier explains that self-esteem is essential to the
autonomy that is often revealed in one's self-trust: "Should one be in a context
in which others ignore or insult one, treat one as inadequate, incompetent,
or unworthy, strong trust in oneself will be a major source for resistance and
emergence. We allude to such self-trust when we speak of 'inner strength' and
'inner emergence'" (114). This inner strength seems to be present in those
possessing autonomy competencies of resistance and resolve; indeed, the
willingness to resist and the resolve to act may just be this inner strength.
Through cultivating self-trust, self-defense training fosters the self-esteem
and self-respect essential to the autonomy competencies of resistance and
resolve. Resiliency on Govier's account appears to be a resiliency of the self to
psychological threats such as insults or offences to one's standing in the moral
community. But, as we saw earlier, autonomy may be undermined in concrete,
•
bodily encoded ways associated with oppressive ideals of femininity. Women
thus need to develop their capacities to resist and resolve to act both despite
and because of these bodily encoded limits to autonomy.
Finally, Govier's view that self-esteem is required for autonomy can be
paralleled to Paul Benson's view that self-worth is integral to autonomy.
Autonomous persons regard themselves not only as able to respond to the various
expectations others may have of them, but worthy of responding to others'
expectations. Benson argues that lack of self-worth is evidenced when we do
not regard ourselves as competent to answer for our conduct in light of others'
expectations and demands (Benson 1994, 660). We should be careful, however,
to distinguish a felt competence to answer to others from a felt obligation to do
so. Self-worth includes considering oneself worthy to respond to inappropriate
expectations as one deems fit. So, for example, a person confronting another
with an aggressive expectation of sexual compliance deserves a rejection of that
expectation. This rejection evidences self-worth, particularly if it stands alone
without justification or explanation. Such rejections demonstrate trust that
one's responses are appropriate.
Often women face inappropriate expectations that effectively undermine
their autonomy—ideals and expectations such as passivity, servility, or
docility endorsed by traditional standards of femininity like those captured
in the Beauty Myth. These expectations inappropriately foster the oppression
of women, particularly through encouraging women to submit to personal
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violence rather than to act against it.8 Self-defense training provides a concrete
way of overcoming bodily encoded limits to freedom associated with those
ideals. When women act against these ideals through self-defense training they
enhance their autonomy by fostering their abilities, physical and emotional, to
reject certain expectations as inappropriate and so assert their self-worth.
Bodily intactness and wholeness, what we might call bodily integrity, is an
essential component of protecting and defending self-worth.9 Those who live
under oppression are familiar with the ease with which an individual may
override another's bodily integrity through acts of personal violence aimed at
dominating the other. Cultivating the ability to protect oneself indicates one's
resolve to uphold one's commitments in the face of the threat of personal
violence that accompanies women's oppression. Personal violence against
women is not, however, simply a personal matter; it is deeply woven into
systems of oppression operating in society. Self-defense training is not a means
of changing those oppressive systems but of changing women's possibility
for autonomy as persons living under those systems. Until those systems are
eliminated,'self-defense training provides a concrete means of protecting and
fostering women's autonomy under threat of personal violence.
Self-defense training is, of course, not the only means of increasing resistance
and resolve in contexts of oppression. Physical strength or athletic training
provide sources of physically countering or resisting others, while intellectual
skills such as reasoning, argumentation, and persuasion provide other sources
of resistance and resolve.10 So too, emotions such as courage, trust, or anger may
each supply key bases for the resistance and resolve essential to autonomy.11 Yet
self-defense training differs from these other avenues of autonomy development.
Self-defense training introduces an important element in virtue of learning
to defend one's self from possible harm. This training implicitly develops the
attitude that what one is defending is worth defending. Thus, undertaking this
training expresses one's value of oneself, seen in its development of self-worth,
self-trust, self-esteem, and self-respect.
8. Another way is through encouraging women not to see personal violence as personal
violence but to redescribe it in seemingly innocuous ways: sexual assaults can be said to be "sexual
advances," for instance.
9.1 say more about the relation of self-defense to the notion of integrity in my paper "Protecting
One's Commitments: Emotion, Integrity, and Self-Defence" (in progress).
10. Thanks to Carolyn McLeod for pointing out the relevance of these skills.
11. Sometimes resistance and resolve are required to develop those emotional skills. Learning
to trust one's emotional responses or recovering one's ability to become angry may call for one to
resist others' interpretations of one's emotions or to resolve to separate oneself from dominant
groups (Burrow 2005).
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$. AUTONOMY UNDER THREAT OF PERSONAL VIOLENCE
In this section, ! consider four different responses to my view that self-defense
skills provide an important resource for furthering autonomy for women as a
group under threat of personal violence. First, one might object to the whole
idea of learning self-defense with the claim that it takes less time and effort
to learn how to use a gun, which is perhaps an even better form of defending
oneself. Aside from legal or moral considerations against gun ownership, I see
two practical reasons to reject that view of self-defense. The first is that the
attacker may use that weapon against the defender. The second reason is that
if the weapon is taken away, and if it is the only way one has to defend oneself,
the defender is left without any defense. Of course, one could learn supporting
skills of self-defense training to prevent both of the above possibilities of harm.
But given the potential for further harm by carrying a weapon, it is in one's best
interest to learn traditional self-defense instead.12
Second, self-defense training might only seem to work as a means of
•
enhancing autonomy for those with the ability to undertake that training. A
corollary of considering autonomy as a function of both bodily and psychological
competencies is that it may appear to advantage those with developed abilities
in both areas and thus support an implicit ableism. However, this response fails
to appreciate the fact that the skills of self-defense are inherently adaptive to
one's constitution as a part of being effective responses. Effective self-defense
training develops an awareness of one's own best proficiencies. Some persons
best defend themselves with their feet, others with their elbows, legs, knees, or
hands, while others simply evade attacks. Those who are incapable of moving
their bodies either directly or indirectly will be unable to develop physical skills
of self-defense, just as those who are incapable of fairly complex cognition and
judgment will be unable to develop the attitudinal and emotional skills required
to react in a controlled and deliberate manner. Thus, while some might excel
at developing an array of varying self-defense skills, others may possess little or
no ability to do so.
The implication that those who are unable to acquire self-defense skills
thereby necessarily possess a weakened autonomy is indeed ableist, but it is not
entailed by my argument. I have not argued that only the skill of self-defense
furthers autonomy. I have aimed to establish the narrower claim that acquiring
12. Martial arts training may, of course, include weapons training. However, martial arts
weapons training only introduces the same two vulnerabilities outlined above if the practitioner
does not also possess the ability to defend herself with empty hands.
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self-defense skills is a valuable means of increasing one's degree of autonomy.
Disability activists concerned about the implications of viewing self-defense
as a means to autonomy would do well to consider the distressingly high rates
at which women with disabilities experience personal violence. In Canada, 39
percent of women reported that they were sexually assaulted at least once in
their lives, while 83 percent of women with disabilities made a similar report
(AVAW 2002; VAWD 2004). Self-defense training for women with disabilities,
far from undermining their autonomy, has the potential of benefitting those
who need it the most.
Third, promoting self-defense skills as a means of furthering women's
autonomy may seem elitist.13 While many martial arts and self-defense groups
are nonprofit organizations, some do operate for profit. The worry is that
training might be available only for the privileged few who can afford the time
and money to engage in regular self-defense training. To prevent such inequality,
self-defense training could be offered as part of a regular school curriculum. I am
not the first to consider such an idea. As early as 1904, Tsuyoshi Chitose (2000)
introduced martial arts training as part of the school curriculum in Japan with
the aim of instilling attitudes of respect between persons in general and with
a focus on practical self-defense for girls. In contemporary societies, teaching
self-defense to girls in school will need careful consideration of the political
structure of its implementation. As a rule, the threat of violence against girls
and women varies depending on factors such as race, ability, sexual orientation,
age, and cultural, educational, and economic status (Savary 1994; Mclvor and
Nahanee 1998; Jiwani 2000). If teaching self-defense does not address the needs
of women and girls facing intersecting systems of oppression that support a
culture of violence, then it will not meet the needs of all equally well. Relatedly,
like teachers in general, instructors of self-defense must be aware of teaching
practices that implicitly endorse biases, because children, in particular, may
easily internalize oppressive norms and values. How self-defense will be taught
thus requires careful attention to ensure that limitations to autonomy are not
implicitly endorsed as part of the training.
If teaching self-defense to girls and young women were systematic, then it
would not be merely a personal solution but instead would constitute a political
move challenging oppressive patriarchal systems.14 So, widespread self-defense
13. Thanks to Susan Sherwin for stimulating exchanges concerning this worry.
14. My suggestion that self-defense classes can be offered in the public school system to obviate
equality imbalances has since been suggested to me by audience members at Dalhousie University
and also appears in Meyers (20043).
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training promises to weaken the social structures supporting violence against
women. Of course, overturning the valorization of aggressive male stereotypes
and the glamorization of male dominance over women might also undermine
the prevalence of violence toward women. But until that happens, girls could be
raised to subvert the system in one concretely attainable way, through learning
self-defense. Some might object here that introducing self-defense training in
schools could increase school violence, already a serious problem.
This concern about school violence is a special case of a more general
concern, which brings us to the fourth response. It might seem that self-defense
encourages aggression in the individual, which has negative implications for the
self and for society in general. It is a common feature of self-defense training
that students are encouraged to get angry, to yell, and to attack other persons.
So we might think that encouraging a system of self-defense broadly promotes
aggressive attitudes, thereby supporting a culture of violence or aggression.15
While self-defense training may begin with emotions and attitudes such as anger
and aggression, this is not the aim or ideal of traditional self-defense training.
Initially, becoming angry or aggressive is a key point of training, particularly for
women who have internalized feminine ideals of passivity and acquiescence.
Getting angry, yelling, grabbing physical space around oneself, or otherwise
being physically assertive are all instances of engagement with the world that
girls and women have been socialized to avoid. Their bodies are unaccustomed
to such actions. It is difficult to disrupt typical patterns of behavior, but in
the case of self-defense training it is a requirement.16 Women who are adept at
commanding their bodies to act in physically assertive ways and who have also
developed the self-confidence to avoid conflict have attained a skill that is both
central to self-defense training and inherently paradoxical. The end of self-
defense training is paradoxical, for it aims to produce skilled persons capable
of self-defense so that they have no need of using self-defense: its ideal is the
path of nonviolence. While bell hooks (1989) is right to say that learning to use
15. Angry or aggressive attitudes can actually undermine the execution of self-defense techniques
because strong emotional responses such as these are likely to impede the judgment and flexibility
of responses required for effective self-defense. Here the aim is not to produce passionless persons,
but to cultivate an ability to calm oneself in pressing moments of danger so as to allow self-defense
techniques to be the most effective at the time they are needed the most.
16. Initially overcoming restrictive bodily behaviors must be within the command of students of
self-defense if they are to progress. Imaginative practices of envisioning dangerous or discomforting
situations aids this endeavor, because imagining one's best responses in such situations increases
one's actual ability to react appropriately in self-defense. Such effects of imaginative training on
physical performance are commonly understood as key elements of athletic training, both by sport
psychologists and athletes. For an overview of the literature, see Grouios (1992).
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physical force is a way to remove the terror and dread of violence, it is also a
greater source of pride that one is capable of using physical force but does not
feel a need or desire to use it.
6. SECURITY AND SUBVERSIVENESS
I have aimed to show how the emotional, attitudinal, and physical competencies
developed through self-defense training foster autonomy through promoting
two required autonomy competencies, resistance and resolve. Self-defense
training provides a concrete avenue for women to lift bodily encoded limits
to autonomy: it frees women from typically encoded restrictions in posture,
movement, or reactions; and it encourages women to claim their rightful physical
presence and to defend it as reasonable. The degree to which one is confident
in one's ability to defend oneself is closely related to increased autonomy. One
cannot freely choose to draw boundaries on one's interactions with others if
one does not'consider it safe to leave, to disagree, or to otherwise reject others'
demands of oneself. Learning self-defense supplies a certain degree of self-
confidence, confidence in one's competency to protect oneself against personal
violence in threatening situations. Self-defense training is, in effect, a socially
subversive act. Being able to take a stand before others while living under social
pressure to be passive and accepting—to possess self-confidence rather than
to be dispirited or dissuaded by the possibility of personal violence—serves to
exemplify how autonomy may thrive in spite of oppressive circumstances.
Self-defense training is not a panacea for the problem of violence against
women and girls. It may ultimately do nothing to prevent the prevalence of
attempted personal violence. But neither is it just a stopgap measure until the
culture of violence against women is overthrown. Self-defense training provides
a theoretically and practically significant opportunity for developing women's
autonomy. Feminist theories of autonomy have shown us that autonomy
is best understood in terms of degrees, proceeding according to the sorts of
psychological competencies one possesses. My account shows how bodily and
psychological competencies may work together to promote autonomy. Self-
defense training produces self-confidence that fosters self-trust that both one's
psychological and bodily competencies will come together to act as needed.
Self-trust here widens one's possibilities for action in virtue of promoting
associated attitudes of self-worth, self-esteem, and self-respect that are essential
to autonomy. The interrelationship between psychological capacities and bodily
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capacities is essential to recognize in a relational account of autonomy because
its aim is to show that autonomy is not merely a function of one's capacity to
choose, it is also a function of one's ability to form and exercise choices within
contexts that often constrain choice and action. A culture of violence against
women introduces constraints to autonomy that self-defense training is well
suited to overcome through developing closely linked bodily and psychological
capacities significant to the formation and exercise of choice.
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